Budapest is racked with tension. As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sends a stream of refugees to Hungary’s eastern border, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has scrambled to respond to the humanitarian crisis while turning his back on his previous pragmatic relationship with Moscow.

Fidesz’s unequivocal condemnation of Vladimir Putin’s actions will have come as a relief to Brussels. But a bitter argument still rages over Hungary’s opposition to the bloc’s new ‘rule of law’ budget mechanism, which allows EU funds to be made dependent on adherence to legal and democratic norms.

When the European Court of Justice rejected a challenge to the mechanism from Hungary and Poland on February 16, Hungary’s struggle with the bloc ratcheted up a notch. The dispute is key to Fidesz’s stance for Hungarian national sovereignty within the EU, and it is almost certain that the government won’t back down with crunch elections approaching on April 3.

When I meet Hungarian Justice Minister Judit Varga – who has been leading the country’s rule of law struggle – in Budapest, while on a press trip organised by the Hungarian government, she’s quick to stress the significance of the latest ECJ ruling.

‘This was a political judgement, meaning the ECJ has become a political actor,’ she said. ‘We already knew the European Commission is political, and the European parliament is, by definition, a political body, always pressuring for funding to be linked to political requirements. Unfortunately, the Court has now approved these attempts.’

The EU says its rule of law mechanism is intended to prevent the misuse of EU funds by corrupt or undemocratic governments. This is something of an irony considering the warm reception given to Ukraine’s urgent request for EU membership – last year, Transparency International found Ukraine to be only marginally less corrupt than Russia itself.

Varga points out as well the subjectivity the EU has when distinguishing between the rule of law in different member states – a subtlety which Brussels seems happy to ignore.

‘The “rule of law” has no exact definition. Every country is different. As an example: in Hungary, the Justice Minister has no structural influence over the functioning of the judiciary. In other EU states, the Justice Minister stands above the judiciary. In some, like Germany, the Justice Minister can even instruct the public prosecutor. So which state is better for the rule of law: Germany, or Hungary? It’s impossible to say: “you are the good guy, you are the bad guy,” because there are so many elements in which we differ from each other.’

Varga notes that by doing away with the need for unanimity to sanction a member state under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, the rule of law mechanism is ‘a tool giving free rein to political pressure.’ But pressure against what? The European Commission insists its problems with Hungary relate to corruption, while Varga is unequivocal in describing the mechanism as a weapon in the culture wars.

She relates how the EU’s attitude on disbursing funds to Hungary changed when the Child Protection Act, a law widely characterised as homophobic, was introduced in June last year.

‘Until that time, we had very good negotiations on the pandemic recovery fund – Ursula von der Leyen was even about to ask for an appointment to come to Budapest to shake hands. Then we adopted the Child Protection Act – and she described it as a shameful act, without even asking me, the Justice Minister, to provide her with the text.’
‘We saw unprecedented outrage from people who had not even read the law, calling us a homophobic government. But there is no discrimination in the law. There is simply a statement that education must be free of any kind of lobbying, for any kind of sexuality. There is a progressive liberal trend to normalise LGBT lobbying in schools, already common in western Europe – we just don’t want this to happen here.’

Couldn’t it be argued that through such interventions Fidesz is equally guilty of trying to regulate Hungary’s culture? ‘Not regulate: preserve. Just preserve,’ says Varga. ‘Unfortunately, the world is so crazy now that you must declare self-evident things at a constitutional level and protect them. Like saying that a marriage is between a man and a woman. This has been our reality for many centuries, and we would like to preserve this. We are not against anyone; we would just like to keep ourselves and our culture as they were before. But this is now a sin in the eyes of the political mainstream in Europe.’

Indeed, Fidesz has been surprised at the readiness of the EU’s traditional conservative forces – notably the European People’s Party, of which Fidesz was a member until last year – to cave in when confronted with the liberal mainstream. ‘This is why we’re sad that the UK left the European Union, as it was a big ally in these sovereignty fights,’ says Varga. ‘The EU’s motto is “United in Diversity”, but it’s pushing only for unity and forgetting all about diversity. If we lose our own cultural identity, we’ll become a mass of unidentified individuals, and only profits and supranational interests will prevail.’

Varga argues the bloc’s true intentions with the rule of law mechanism were revealed when EU Commissioner for Equality Helena Dalli declared in November 2020 that it would be a way to ‘bring a member state in line’ on cultural issues. As such, Varga is sceptical about whether answering EU requests for a stronger anti-corruption framework would really make the problems go away.

‘To think so would be too naïve,’ she says with a rueful smile. ‘As long as we have a national conservative government which puts the Hungarian people first, there will always be a problem with us. This is political blackmail – it’s a witch hunt.’

Behind the scenes, she says, are international NGOs who hate the Orbán regime. ‘Brussels is outsourcing rule of law issues and political debates to international NGOs. In blackmailing a country, it refers to “rule of law reports” with distorted information mostly compiled by NGOs.’

‘But who elected these NGOs? If you want to determine, influence or answer people’s needs, you should form a political party. There are very strict rules to form a party; stricter rules than for forming an NGO. We shouldn’t mix up these two things.’

Budapest’s struggle with Brussels calls into question the institutional modus operandi underpinning the entire European project. Although the Ukraine crisis has resulted in temporary EU unity, could Hungary’s struggle for sovereignty eventually lead to a ‘Huxit’ from the bloc?

‘No. There’s no agenda from the Hungarian government to leave the EU. We are fighting for what we joined. The original concept was to have a cooperation where every member state can keep their own identity but share some competences so that we can be more successful together. Unfortunately, the notion of ever-closer union, which was the problem for Britain, is now interfering in domains which touch upon the very heart of the nation: cultural identify, the family concept, and migration.’

For Varga, it’s the relative weakness of governments in other EU countries – many of them unwieldy coalitions – which stops them standing up to this pernicious encroachment on national sovereignty. ‘For the sake of short-term political gains, they give up on their principles.’ They cannot ‘name things for what they are’ on cultural issues, for fear of angering domestic political partners. ‘They learned how to be politically correct, which is, I think, the biggest mistake of European politics.’

It’s this difference in attitudes which has made the Hungarian elections so significant on the international stage. Varga cites an emotional wave of support from conservatives across the EU for Fidesz’s stance.

‘It’s a patriotic fight. It’s defending your country. It unites us. It’s very misguided for EU institutions to think that such interventions help the Hungarian opposition. But liberals truly believe that what they are doing is good for humanity.’ Does their unshakeable faith mean Hungary and the EU could be engaged in a culture war without end? ‘Yes. These critics just cannot swallow the fact that the views of most Hungarian citizens are not in line with their dreams.’

A protracted ideological struggle and the risk of losing EU funds are risks which Fidesz is willing to take for the sake of traditional family culture and national sovereignty – which for Varga are inseparable concepts.

‘It’s in the interests of those who believe in a federalist union to demolish the nation. How do you demolish the nation? You destroy the bricks making up the nation; and these building bricks are families. If you relativise the concept of family – if you disperse, dissolve, make ridiculous, the traditional family concept – you are attacking the very heart of the nation. Growing up in a family, we know who we are, and where we belong. We will always protect this kind of national identity.’